Business Ethics Quarterly xviii takes a largely a priori view of the social contract, elaborating its content through thought experiments, leaving little room for empirical considerations. The second stage, represented by Donaldson's collaborative work with Tom Dunfee in The Ties That Bind (1999) , takes empirical considerations more seriously. The Ties that Bind proposes a version of the social contract that has contractors agreeing to cede moral authority to some norms that vary across cultures. The authority of such norms is determined, in part, by empirical considerations. In both his versions of social contract theory, Donaldson appeals to the norms that the social contract endorses as a way to approach concrete problems in business ethics.
A second area exemplifying the role of theory in Donaldson's work concerns the corporation's status as a responsible agent. While some authors argue that the corporation seems to make choices in ways that qualify it for status of a person, Donaldson expresses doubt on this score, and defends an alternative interpretation of the corporation (1982) . On Donaldson's view, the corporation cannot be a person, because it lacks some of the requisite moral attributes of personhood, but it can nonetheless be a responsible agent.
The third area of theory I will mention involves, in my view, both Donaldson's most practical contribution to business decision-making and his most conceptually challenging deployment of moral theory. Donaldson offers a model of moral reasoning, rooted in Kant's universalizability principle, that aims to provide guidance on moral decision-making for people who act in social and cultural environments that differ from their own. He defends a moral principle that answers hard moral questions-including, e.g., questions about morally acceptable wage and safety standards in poverty-stricken countries-while purporting to respect both cultural differences and universal human rights (1989, 1999) . This work on moral principle is consonant, as I see it, with Donaldson's work on the social contract.
Donaldson was not, of course, alone in bringing a new level of theoretical sophistication to business ethics. Patricia Werhane, Norman Bowie, R. Edward Freeman, Tom Dunfee and others in his "cohort" also deserve great credit for changing the way that we think about business ethics. But because of his eloquence, rigor, and sophistication, Donaldson's work has played a unique role in inspiring a generation of business ethics scholars to think imaginatively about the role of theory in business ethics reasoning. Articles in this issue confi rm the power of his work.
Margaret Blair, in her article, "Of Corporations, Courts, Personhood, and Morality," identifi es a tension in recent corporate jurisprudence. On the one hand, the Supreme Court identifi es many corporate rights that protect corporate purposes beyond profi tmaking, including rights of political participation and religious practice; on the other hand, courts increasingly identify shareholder wealth maximization as the predominant corporate goal. But if corporations are simply about making money for shareholders, why care about the right to practice religion or make political statements? Blair explains the diffi culties in resolving this tension and looks to Donaldson's social contract model as an alternative for understanding the rights and purposes of the corporation.
Nien-hê Hsieh, in "The Social Contract Model of Corporate Purpose and Responsibility," surveys the critical literature on Donaldson's use of social contract theory, and concludes that it contains much insight. In particular, he considers the Normative Business Ethics in a Global Economy xix arguments that Donaldson's use of social contract theory is indeterminate in ways that preclude him from reaching the main conclusions in business ethics he seeks to prove. Hsieh offers several interesting attempts to limit the alleged indeterminacy in Donaldson's social contract model, but argues that the modifi cations don't bring Donaldson closer to his desired conclusions.
In their article, "How are Ethical Values Related to Economic Prosperity?" Peter Jennings and Manuel Velasquez credit Donaldson for his investigation of how moral values play a role in economic success, but suggest that the discussion of ethical values can be strengthened by considering the role that social institutions play in the relation between ethical values and economic performance. They propose a complex institutional framework that draws on social science in order to develop Donaldsonian ideas in new ways.
In "Can Hypernorms be Justifi ed? Insights from a Discourse-Ethical Perspective," Andreas Scherer raises doubts about the role of universal moral norms (hypernorms) in Integrative Social Contract Theory (ISCT), the version of social contract theory that Donaldson developed with Tom Dunfee. Neither Donaldson nor Dunfee provide a convincing argument for the existence of hypernorms, Scherer contends. He takes on the instructive task of explaining how the leading fi gures in discourse theory, a set of recent developments deriving from German philosophy, can be helpful in understanding the status of putative universal moral norms.
In her article "Denying Corporate Rights and Punishing Corporate Wrongs," Amy Sepinwall aims to vindicate an idea she attributes to Donaldson: that even if corporations are not moral persons, they nonetheless have substantial responsibilities. Along the way, she argues that arguments about corporate personhood are beside the point. Sepinwall reminds us of the possibility that, at times, nobody within a corporation commits a relevant wrong, but wrongdoing nonetheless, emerges from the fi rm, thus justifying us in prosecuting and punishing the corporation. The possibility of these moral phenomena, she further maintains, shows that reasonable judgments about corporate responsibility are independent of moral claims about personhood, thus vindicating Donaldson. In "Inverting Donaldson's Framework: A Managerial Approach To International Confl icts Of Cultural And Economic Norms," Andrew Stark proposes an ingenious twist on a model of moral reasoning that Donaldson developed. This model offers a way to think about moral decision-making in countries whose norms seem different from our own. Stark proposes a refi nement of Donaldson's model. While Donaldson asks how we should respond to differences in norms when those differences are explained by differences in culture, Stark suggests that it matters, in ways that Donaldson doesn't recognize, why the differences in culture exist and how they are likely to evolve. Asking about the historical trajectory of these differences, Stark suggests, makes salient important moral considerations too easily overlooked in Donaldson's model. Danielle Warren, Marietta Peytcheva, and Jospeh P. Gaspar use aspects of Integrative Social Contracts Theory to address a stubborn problem in business ethics: how to make sense of confl icting moral prescriptions coming from different apparent sources of authority within a business organization. In their contribution, "When Ethical Tones at the Top Confl ict: Adapting Priority Rules to Reconcile Confl icting Tones," they propose that in trying to resolve confl icting prescriptions, an employee may reasonably rely on ISCT's priority rules, which Donaldson and Dunfee model after the law treating confl icts within a legal system. Donaldson and Dunfee notice that just as laws in different jurisdictions may confl ict, so too can moral principles emerging out of different national or cultural groups confl ict. They use the well-developed jurisprudence of confl icts as a model for understanding confl icting moral principles. Warren, Peytcheva, and Gaspar explore the possibility of extending this model to cover moral confl icts arising from within a business organization. There is an interesting empirical question whether these rules for handling confl ict, which are complex, can guide business decision-making. The authors explore ways to address that question.
In reading through the essays in this issue, one is struck by the fact that while many of the authors fi nd Donaldson's work a platform for their own work, other authors fi nd Donaldson to be wrong on some fundamental point. This should be no surprise. The mark of an interesting thinker is not that his work commands consensus. It is instead that his work triggers insightful discussion and intelligent debate. These essays offer evidence that Donaldson is quite interesting.
